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Abstract 
In many different contexts individuals take decisions on the behalf of others. However, little is known 
about how this circumstance affects the decision making process and influences the ultimate 
individuals' choices. In this paper, we focus on the context of investment decisions and study if (and 
how) lottery-type investment decisions made on behalf of another person differ i) compared to 
decisions which do not affect anyone else, and ii) depending on the social distance between who 
makes the decision and who is affected by it. Our results shows that social distance (i.e., whether the 
person affected by one's decision is an unknown stranger or a friend) is an important determinant when 
people decide on the behalf of others. Individuals are heterogeneous in their individual investment 
strategies but, on average, when deciding on behalf of a friend rather than only for themselves or a 
stranger, their behaviour is closer to expected value maximization, exhibiting less risk taking. We 
interpret these findings as evidence of other regarding preferences affecting the decision making 
process in lottery-type decisions when the social distance is shortened. 
Keywords 
Risk seeking, Other Regarding Preferences, Social Distance,Friends, Lottery-type investment 
JEL Classification: A13, C91, D64, D81 
  
 
1 Introductiona
Individuals take decisions aﬀecting themselves as well as others, like spouse,
children, colleagues, employees, shareholders, customers, patients, and voters.
Despite the fact that these situations are extremely common in everyday life,
still a little is known about how feeling responsible for another person aﬀects
the individuals’ decision making (see e.g. Sutter, 2009; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2010; Pahlke et al., 2012a).
The aim of this paper is to study how risk taking varies when investment
decisions refer to a lottery-type project (i.e.an investment project with negative
expected value), and are made on behalf of another person under diﬀerent levels
of social distance compared to the case when decisions do not aﬀect anyone else.
In this analysis we will focus on two elements: the relevance of other regarding
preferences and the eﬀect of social distance. Concerning the ﬁrst element, by
deﬁnition, the presence of someone else may aﬀect the decision maker only if
he takes into account other’s outcome or feels responsible for others’ gains and
losses. The other element playing an important role is the social distance be-
tween the decision maker and the person aﬀected by the investment choice. For
example, a situation characterized by high social distance is the one of a mu-
tual fund manager investing clients’ money (Bergstresser et al., 2009). Usually,
this situation is completely anonymous in the sense that the fund manager does
not know the identity of the investors. On the contrary, in other situations the
social distance is lower, ﬁnancial and investment advisors develop a personal
relationship with clients, and face-to-face contact exists even between pension
fund managers and clients (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002). Many other similar
cases can be listed and a number of intermediate cases exist in real word.1
The common element of the situations mentioned is that a decision maker
makes an investment choice on behalf of another person. What varies –despite
1At one extreme, there are CEOs working for large companies, who meet the shareholders
just at the annual general meeting; at the other extreme, there are managers of small and
medium companies, who are much closer to the controlling shareholders (Claessens et al.,
2000). Middle managers, being at the intermediate level of the hierarchy, have social contacts
with their subordinates and, at the same time, aﬀect their colleagues by implementing the
organization’s strategic objectives with their decisions (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990).
aWe would like to thank Dominique Cappelletti, Paolo Crosetto, Antonio Filippin, Alexia
Gaudel and Matthias Sutter for useful discussion and precious advice, we also thank Dvin
Galstian Pour for excellent research assistance. Rancan gratefully acknowledges the hospitality
of the RSCAS when working on this project as a Jean Monnet Fellow. All remaining errors
are ours.
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some institutional details– is the social distance between the two agents and, in
particular, the possibility of receiving feedbacks about the investment choices
directly from the clients.
In this paper, we choose to focus on lottery type investment based on the
evidence that, in some circumstances, people exhibit risk seeking behaviors,
such as investing in projects with negative expected value, like lotteries, which
seems inconsistent with expected utility maximization. This phenomenon is
not limited to commercial gambling;2 recent studies document that individual
gambling preferences also inﬂuence investment decisions and corporate deci-
sion making. Individual investors overinvest in lottery-type stocks (i.e., stocks
with higher volatility and large positive skewness (Kumar, 2009; Kumar et al.,
2011), and initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) with high expected skewness (Green
and Hwang, 2012). Institutional investors exhibit a substantially heterogeneous
risk-taking proﬁle (Kosowski et al., 2006; Balduzzi and Reuter, 2012), mutual
fund managers change the portfolio’s risk conditional upon past performance
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1997), a number of funds have very risky strategies or
hold concentrated portfolios (Kosowski et al., 2006), and some of them over-
weight lottery-type stocks (Kumar, 2009; Kumar et al., 2011). In the same
vein, gambling attitudes of CEOs inﬂuence mergers (Graham et al., 2011) and
takeovers (Schneider and Spalt, 2013), while personal risk attitude aﬀects cor-
porate policies (Cronqvist et al., 2012; Cain and McKeon, 2012). Moreover,
Graham et al. (2011) ﬁnd that CEOs diﬀer in their risk attitude with respect
to lay population being substantially less risk averse.
Our aim is therefore to investigate whether, in those circumstances, where
individuals seem to act in discordance with expected utility maximization, the
fact that others are aﬀected by their choice may work as a device to induce
individuals to make better investments -in expected terms.
With this aim in mind, we designed an experiment to study how social
distance aﬀects an investment choice where a decision maker (active participant)
chooses the level of investment in a lottery-type project, which has consequences
both for himself and another person (passive participant). We vary the social
distance between the two participants by changing the identity of the person
for whom the active participant decides using two polar cases. In our within
subjects design, each active participant decides only once for himself (herself)
and twice on behalf of someone else: in one treatment the risky decision is made
2It has been documented that individuals spend a consistent amount of money to play
lotteries (Kearney, 2005; Clotfelter and Cook, 1990).
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on behalf of an anonymous stranger, while in the other treatment it is made on
behalf of a friend who comes to the laboratory together with the decision maker.
While a decision for an anonymous stranger represents a situation characterized
by high social distance without the possibility of any feedback, a decision on
behalf of a friend is characterized by low social distance and, most likely, will
be rediscussed after the experimental session. For a decision maker to decide
on behalf of a friend rather than an anonymous stranger also implies a diﬀerent
level of knowledge of the risk propensity of the passive participants, which again
captures well the two extreme situations we want to study. In addition, we study
the determinants of decision making on behalf of others in two contexts which
diﬀer in the frequency of the feedback about the outcome of the investment, to
assess the eﬀect of myopic loss aversion.
We report three main results. First, we ﬁnd that when deciding on behalf of
others, despite all else being equal, individuals make diﬀerent choices than when
they decide only for themselves. These choices made on behalf of others seem
aﬀected by altruistic considerations which are modulated by the social distance
between the decision maker and the participant aﬀected by the outcome of
the investment. Second, we document heterogeneous investment strategies in
diﬀerent decision contexts but, on average, ﬁnd that when deciding on behalf
of someone else, individuals’ investment decisions are more in line with the
expected value maximization, i.e., individuals decide to invest less and, less
frequently, in a lottery yielding negative expected value compared to the case in
which they only invest for themselves or for an anonymous stranger. However,
beliefs seem important, and for male participants, in particular, the identity
of the passive participant is still a signiﬁcant explanatory variable, suggesting
that in those circumstances the decision making process is not a mere cognitive
process. But the feeling of responsibility for the lottery outcomes may also play
an important role. Our third result shows that myopic loss aversion is conﬁrmed
when individuals decide both on behalf of a stranger and, to a lesser extent, a
friend. At the same time, by considering diﬀerent environments in terms of
riskiness of the lottery and feedback about the outcome of the investment, we
ﬁnd that myopic loss averse behavior by the decision maker does not eliminate
the role of altruism and social distance, which seem important determinants
independent of the speciﬁcities of the context.
Our framework oﬀers a novel view of those situations in which people invest
in a lottery-type project on behalf of others. We ﬁnd that deciding on behalf of
others drives people to behave more consistently with expected value maximiza-
3
Social Preferences under Risk: the Role of Social
tion. Thus someone else deciding for us may prevent or, at least, mitigate gam-
bling behavior and the suboptimal associated outcomes. At ﬁrst sight, this may
seem in contrast with the evidence of mutual fund managers and CEOs making
gambling ﬁnancial decisions as well as with the common view that excessively
risky positions by some executives in the ﬁnancial industry, which contributed
to the recent ﬁnancial crisis. However, our results highlight the importance of
i) the identity of the person aﬀected by the outcome of the investment and ii)
his risk attitude and the emotional proximity to the decision maker.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
relevant literature and, Section 3 explains the experimental design. Section
4 proposes a simple framework incorporating other-regarding preferences and
social distance in the investment decision and formulates our research hypothe-
sis. Section 5 and 6 presents the experimental procedure and the main results.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In this section we discuss our experiment with respect to two main streams of
literature. The ﬁrst stream studies risk seeking behavior on behalf of others
(and in particular situations involving responsibility), the second refers to the
relevance of social distance. With respect to the ﬁrst stream, our main contribu-
tion relates to the focus on investment choices yielding negative expected value,
while other papers focus on lotteries yielding positive expected value (with few
exceptions, as Pahlke et al., 2012a). With respect to the second stream, the
novelty of our study consists in varying the social distance between the decision
maker and the passive participant, while other papers study decisions on behalf
of others under a given level of social distance.
Situations involving responsibility identify cases in which the decision maker
decides for others as well as herself. In distributional games characterized by
the absence of any risk (typically dictator, ultimatum, and public good games),
previous studies show that people care about others’ payoﬀs exhibiting other
regarding preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002; An-
dreoni, 1990). However, it is less clear if (and how) other regarding preferences
aﬀect decision making in risky environments. The existing theoretical models
do not provide any prediction about how people behave when taking a risk on
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behalf of others in lottery-type investment (i.e., investment yielding negative
expected value). Recently, a growing number of studies have investigated deci-
sion making in a risky context on behalf of others. Bolton and Ockenfels (2010)
in a dictator game with risky options show that individuals tend to be more risk
averse when the outcomes of the risky decision aﬀect both themselves and the
recipient. Using a similar setting, Brock et al. (2013) ﬁnd that both ex ante and
ex post fairness motives are important. However, most of the papers (see also
Chakravarty et al., 2011; Sutter, 2009) focus on choices with positive expected
value. An interesting exception is Pahlke et al. (2012a), who study decisions on
behalf of others under diﬀerent domains (gain, loss, or mixed domain), ﬁnding
that this varies the risk attitude of the decision maker.3 We choose to focus
our investigation on a project yielding negative expected value motivated by
the attempt to reproduce a situation in which people take decisions on behalf
of someone over lottery investment decisions, as it is the case in many real life
situations.
To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst study to assess the role of social
distance in the context of lottery-type investment. Making risky decisions in
many contexts, people often have to make decisions that aﬀect themselves as
well as others, like colleagues, employees, customers, shareholders, spouses and
children. All these circumstances diﬀer substantially in the level of social dis-
tance between the decision maker and the person aﬀected by the choice. Social
distance can be deﬁned as the degree of similarity, closeness, or “emotional prox-
imity” between individuals involved in a certain situation (Charness and Gneezy,
2008). In the lab this concept has been operationalized in several ways: i) based
on participants’ demographic similarities, e.g. race, nationality, (Glaeser et al.,
2000) and other individual characteristics (Frey and Bohnet, 1999; Charness
et al., 2007); ii) creating artiﬁcial (minimal) groups as deﬁned by Tajfel and
Katok (1970) as in Ball and Eckel (1998); or iii) reducing anonymity as in Hoﬀ-
man et al. (1996). For example, full names were revealed in Holm (2000) and
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) to signal gender and ethnicity. Impersonal com-
munication was introduced by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998), while Frey and
Bohnet (1999) and Rankin (2006) used face-to-face interaction. Irrespectively
from how social distance is deﬁned and measured, in all these studies the un-
3Other aspects investigated relating to decision making for others, which we take into
account, are gender stereotypes (e.g., females being more risk averse than males as passive
participants Daruvala, 2007) and beliefs about others’ risk preferences (Chakravarty et al.,
2011).
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derling hypothesis is that people act more favorably toward those with a higher
degree of social kinship. Therefore, decreasing social distance should increase
the strength of other regarding preferences in the decision making process. In-
deed, these studies document a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between the
reduction of social distance and the frequency of non-selﬁsh decisions.
3 Experimental design
The two key features of our experimental design are: the investment decision
(Section 3.1) and the treatments implemented (Section 3.2).
3.1 The investment decision
We design our lottery-type investment task by introducing a small variation to
the task used in Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Charness and Gneezy (2010)
such that our lottery has a negative expected value. Each participant is given
100 ECUs as endowment and asked to choose the portion of this amount (be-
tween 0 and 100) that she wishes to invest in a lottery-type project. The ECUs
not invested together with the ECUs gained form the earnings obtained from
a given investment decision. Our experiment has three parts. In each part,
participants are confronted with an identical sequence of 12 independent invest-
ment decisions, presented in four blocks of three identical lotteries each.4 In
particular, as shown in Table 1, in each experimental part investment decisions
from 1 to 6 (i.e., block 1 and block 2) correspond to lottery A. Lottery A iden-
tiﬁes a project that is successful with 0.33 probability, returning 2.5 times the
amount invested, while it fails with a complementary probability of 0.67, return-
ing 0. Investment decisions from 7 to 12 (i.e., block 3 and block 4) correspond
to lottery B. Lottery B is successful with 0.25 probability, returning 1.8 times
the amount invested, while it fails with a complementary probability of 0.75,
returning half of the amount invested.
It can be noted that the two lotteries give the same (negative) expected
value, but diﬀer both in their variance (V ar(A) > V ar(B)) and in the fact
that money invested can be totally or partially lost in case of the project’s
failure. Therefore, a decision maker who adopts the expected value criterion for
4Subjects are informed that the three decisions contained in each block are identical. More
details can be found in the Instructions reproduced in English in Appendix A.
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his decision (e.g., maximizes a utility function simply based on expected value)
would never invest any amount in any of the two lotteries.
3.2 The treatments: social distance and feedback
Our experimental design varies two main factors: the social distance and the
feedback frequency regarding the outcome of the investment. The social distance
is varied within subjects and, therefore, within a session subjects experience dif-
ferent levels of social distance (one in each of the three experimental parts). The
feedbacks frequency is varied between subjects and, therefore, within a session
participants always face the same type of feedback for all three parts. Table 2
summarizes our treatments.
Social distance. Following Charness and Gneezy (2008), we deﬁne social dis-
tance as “emotional proximity.” To investigate the impact of social distance we
base our analysis on three treatments within subjects, each implemented in one
of the three parts of our experiment. In part 1, identiﬁed as own treatment (OT),
each participant decides only for herself and her decisions have no consequences
for anyone else. The OT constitutes our baseline to measure individual propen-
sity to risk taking in the environment we consider. At the beginning of part 2,
subjects are divided in to active and passive participants (we will also identify
the active participants as decision makers). The active participants make in-
vestment decisions on behalf of one passive participant. The same role (active
or passive) is retained in part 3. Moving from part 2 to part 3, we manipulate
social distance by varying the identity of the passive participant. Speciﬁcally in
part 2, identiﬁed as stranger treatment (ST), the active participant is asked to
make her investment decisions on behalf of an anonymous passive participant.
In part 3, identiﬁed as friend treatment (FT), the active participant is asked to
make her investment choices on behalf of the friend who came with her to the
lab. Both in ST and FT, we perfectly align the incentives of active and passive
participants. This means that the investment decisions of active participant
determine the same identical payoﬀ for herself and the passive participant.5 In
5Speciﬁcally, the decision situation for the active participant was described as follows:
“Now we are about to start the ﬁrst (second/third/fourth) block of investment decisions.
Each block contains 3 investment decisions. In each period of a block, you will face the same
project and you have to make your investment decision for the passive participant.” Then, on
the decision screen the active participant was required to do the following: “Please indicate
how many ECUs of the PASSIVE participant you want to invest in Project 1. The ECUs
that you dont invest will be accumulated in the total balance of the PASSIVE participant.”
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this way, we rule out by design any concerns for inequality of the experimental
earnings between active and passive participants and, in general, any other form
of other regarding preferences based on the relative comparison of experimental
payoﬀs. We consider this as a conservative choice in terms of design. However,
we think this constitutes a better compromise in order to study –in a laboratory
experiment– the eﬀect of other regarding preferences as well as social distance
in risky environments, compared to other studies in the literature assigning a
ﬁxed payment to the active participants (Daruvala, 2007; Eriksen and Kvaloy,
2010).
Feedback frequency. We implement two variations in the feedback frequency
between subjects, as in Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Charness and Gneezy
(2010). In the frequent feedback treatment (FFT) in each of the twelve invest-
ment periods, each subject ﬁrst decides how many of the 100 ECUs to invest in
the lottery-type project. Then she receives feedback about the success/failure of
the project in that period, and after that another investment period starts until
the twelfth investment period is completed. In the infrequent feedback treat-
ment (IFT), each subject is informed about the success/failure of the project
after a block of three periods, and she then makes an investment decision for
a block of three periods at a time. Therefore, in the IFT each subject, at the
beginning of each block of investment decisions, has to decide how much of her
endowment to invest in the project for the three subsequent periods, and these
investment decisions are restricted to being equal within each block. By varying
the feedback frequency, we measure how myopic loss aversion (MLA) inﬂuences
investment decisions. An individual is said to be loss averse if she is more aware
of losses than gains of equal amount (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). When an
individual evaluates the lottery outcomes at a high frequency, he experiences a
greater dissatisfaction with a negative outcome compared to the case of low fre-
quency evaluation (Thaler, 1985). The combination of loss aversion and mental
accounting gives rise to myopic loss aversion, speciﬁcally people’s propensity to
invest less in the FFT than in IFT.
Payments. Since we are interested in studying if (and how) the decision
environment interacts with individuals’ other regarding preferences and social
Finally, in the instruction the following was speciﬁed: “If this part, i.e., part 2, is selected,
then: 1) the passive participant matched with you will earn the sum of the earnings obtained
as a consequence of your investment choices in each of the 12 periods of part 2. 2) You will
earn the same amount of ECUs he earns.” See the Appendix for more details.
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distance, subjects are informed that only the investment decisions made in one
of the three experimental parts will be randomly selected as relevant for the de-
termination of the experimental earnings. Within each part, however, all twelve
decisions are considered in calculating the payoﬀ of that part, and the earn-
ings cumulated in each investment period are shown to the active participant
in each part. At the end of the twelve investment periods, both in ST and FT,
the passive participants are also informed about the investment decisions made
by the active participant with whom they are matched as well as about the
success/failure of the project in each round.
4 Theoretical framework and hypotheses
In this section we provide a formal representation of the investment decision
faced by our participants and state our research hypotheses.
We model the investment decision of an individual under condition of uncer-
tainty in the spirit of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1970). Consider an individual i
who holds an initial wealth w > 0 and decides to invest in a lottery-type project
an amount q ∈ [0, 1]. The amount not invested in the lottery-type project and
held in a safe account is w − q.
The individual faces the following maximization problem:
V = max
q
u(q
∫
g(ρ)dρ) + u(w − q)
s.t.0 ≤ q ≤ 1
(1)
V is the indirect utility function and g(ρ) denotes the density function of
ρ, being the return of the project. The constraint implies that agents cannot
borrow money and have to invest a positive amount (or 0). Given a twice
diﬀerentiable utility function u(.), the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk
aversion is deﬁned as ri = −u′′/u′.
We generalize the model to consider cases in which individual i decides on behalf
of another individual, j. We deﬁne γi, which captures concerns for others’
payoﬀs,6 and depends on the social distance, dij ∈ [0,∞), between individuals
i and j. In particular, if dij = 0, as for example in OT, individual i’s decision
does not aﬀect anyone else and the problem reduces to equation 1. If dij > 0,
6Regarding the heterogeneity of preferences see Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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concerns for others’ payoﬀs and social distance may aﬀect the invested amount
q. Formally, this can be summarized as follows:
(2) V =
⎧⎨
⎩
maxq u
(
q
∫
g(ρ)dρ
)
+ u(w − q), if dij = 0
maxq u
(
q
(
1 + γi
1
dij
)∫
g(ρ)dρ
)
+ u(w − q), otherwise
This simple formulation has signiﬁcant implications. The solution, q∗, for
a decision maker is to choose the amount to be invested in the risky asset
depending on the existing situation. While in all circumstances q∗ depends on
the individual risk attitude, the optimal solution varies in the weight attached
to others’ payoﬀs and in the social distance when the decision maker decides on
behalf of someone else.
Based on this formulation, we derive and test three main hypotheses related to
how average investment decisions are made on behalf of others compared to a
situation where dij = 0: i) the role of other regarding preferences and social
distance; ii) the heterogeneity of individual strategies of investment; and iii) the
feedback frequency and relevance of MLA.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis refers to how other regarding preferences (ORP) and
social distance (SD) aﬀect the decision of the active participants.
HYPOTHESIS 1.
1.a Other Regarding Preferences: qOT = qST & qOT = qFT .
Investment decisions made by active participants on behalf of a stranger (ST)
or a friend (FT) diﬀer with respect to investment decisions that do not have
consequences for others (OT).
1.b Social Distance: qST = qFT .
Investment decisions made by active participants on behalf of a stranger (ST)
and a friend (FT) diﬀer from each other.
Diﬀerently than in OT, in ST and FT the ORPs and SD may aﬀect the ac-
tive participants’ decision. Thus, if ORPs do not aﬀect the active participants’
investment decisions, we should expect that, on average, the investment deci-
sions made by the active participants in OT, ST, and FT are not diﬀerent from
each other. On the contrary, we interpret any diﬀerence between the investment
10
Natalia Montinari and Michela Rancan
decisions made in ST and FT (compared to the investment decisions made in
OT), as evidence of the relevance of ORPs (Hypothesis 1.a) and, speciﬁcally,
altruism. Given the risk sharing payment scheme we adopted in ST and FT, we
can exclude by design the relevance of any model of ORP based on the relative
comparison of payoﬀs as, for example, in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) since our
active participants do not face any trade-oﬀ between own and other’s payoﬀ.
The decisions of the active participants in our environment are compatible with
models where participants’ payoﬀ depends on their own monetary payoﬀ and
–as an externality– the payoﬀ of their opponents (see Becker, 1974; Andreoni,
1990; Rotemberg, 1994). In presence of ORP, it does not only matter whether
someone else is aﬀected by own investment decisions, but the social distance,
dij , between the active and the passive participants may also play a role. In
particular, in situations characterized by low social distance, other regarding
concerns should have a stronger weight in the individual’ investment decisions
(e.g., in FT) compared to situations characterized by high social distance (e.g.
ST). Therefore, if social distance does not aﬀect individuals’ investment deci-
sions, then we should not observe any diﬀerence when comparing decisions in
ST and FT. On the contrary, we interpret any diﬀerence in these decisions as
evidence of the role of social distance, (Hypothesis 1.b).
Our second hypothesis focuses on individual investment strategies to inves-
tigate how altruism aﬀects the decision making process.
HYPOTHESIS 2.
2.a Individual Investment Strategies. When deciding on behalf of others, indi-
viduals adopt heterogeneous investment strategies.
2.b Individual Consistency. Individuals consistently change their investment
decisions when deciding on behalf of a stranger and a friend.
The way in which altruism aﬀects the decision making process is not a priori
obvious and, in particular, we believe it may depend on two factors: 1) the
active participants’ beliefs about the risk attitude of the passive participant;
and 2) the expected emotions associated to a feeling of responsibility in case of
investment failure. If the ﬁrst factor dominates, being the passive participant’s
11
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payoﬀ expressed in expected terms, the active participant might either increase
his investment (if he believes that the passive participant is more willing to take
a risk than he is) or decrease the amount invested to secure a certain amount
of money for the other participant (if he thinks that the passive participant
is less willing to take a risk than he is). If the second factor dominates,7 we
should observe lower investment in parts ST and FT compared to OT since the
active participant is more afraid of losing the other’s money. For this reason
we investigate, at an individual level, patterns of increase/decrease in the in-
vested amount across treatments (henceforth investment strategy) depending
on the SD and test for the consistency of the adopted strategy across treat-
ments. Thus, while in case we observe an increase in the investment we can
interpret it as driven by the active participant’s beliefs about the risk attitude
of the passive participants. In case we observe a decrease in the investment from
OT to ST/FT, both the beliefs about the other’s risk attitude and the feeling
of responsibility may explain the change in the active participant’s investment
decision. Controlling for the beliefs of the active participants about the risk
proﬁle of the passive participant in each part, we are able to assess the relative
eﬀect of these two explanations. Moreover, we gain further insights into the
decision making process by studying the consistency of the investment strategy
across the diﬀerent experimental parts.
The third hypothesis is based on the feedback frequency treatments and tests
the presence of MLA in lottery-type investment as well as its interaction with
ORP and SD.
HYPOTHESIS 3.
3.a Feedback frequency. γiFFT  γiIFT and dijFFT  dijIFT
ORP and SD aﬀect the decision making process when decisions are made on
behalf of a stranger (ST) or a friend (FT) both in the frequent feedback treat-
ment (FFT) and in the infrequent feedback treatment(IFT).
3.b Myopic Loss Aversion. qFFT−S < qIFT−S and qFFT−F < qIFT−F
Amounts invested by active participants on behalf of a stranger (ST), or a friend
(FT), are lower in the frequent feedback environment (FFT) than in the infre-
quent feedback environment (IFT).
7Expected emotions are taken into account in decision making through a cognitive process
(Loewenstein et al., 2001).
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The feedback frequency of in any risky situation aﬀects the decision making
process. While in the frequent treatment the investment decisions may depend
greatly on the lottery outputs, wins and losses play a less important role when
the feedback is infrequent. On top of that, in case individuals evaluate losses
more negatively, as documented extensively in the literature, they will invest
a lower amount in the FFT, which, given the negative expected value of the
lottery, may lead to a decrease of suboptimal outcomes. In presence of another
person aﬀected by the outcome of the investment, however, it is not obvious
whether ORP and SD play a role in both feedback contexts and, if so, to which
extent (Hypothesis 3.a).
In addition, the frequency treatments allow us to study whether MLA -individuals
investing less in the FFT than in IFT- is relevant when an active participant
decides on behalf of a passive participant (hypothesis 3b). It might be that
the presence of someone else helps the active participants to view the decision
more in line with expected value maximization (which, in this case, implies that
MLA is ampliﬁed, i.e., that decision makers invest less, and less often). Diﬀer-
ently, it might be that this behavioral bias is persistent in part 2 and part 3 or
even emphasized in case the decision maker considers the investment even more
attractive because he is deciding for someone else.
5 Procedures and summary statistics
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree Fischbacher (2007) and conducted
at the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics Jena
(Germany) between April and August 2013. The participants were undergrad-
uate students from the Friedrich Schiller University Jena; they were recruited
using the ORSEE software Greiner (2004) and invited to come to the lab with
a friend of the same gender. The name, surname, and e-mail address of the
friend had to be communicated via email to the experimenters at least 24 hours
before the scheduled sessions in order to verify that s/he had not participated
in another session of the same experiment before. Upon entering the labora-
tory, subjects were randomly assigned to visually isolated computer terminals.
Participants were informed that the experiment had three parts and that they
would receive instructions for the second (third) part once the ﬁrst (second)
part was completed. Our matching protocol is such that, once part 2 starts,
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each friend of the couple knows that everyone has the same probability to be
assigned the role of active and passive participant. Once roles are assigned in
part 2, they are then retained in both parts 2 and 3, but subjects are informed
about the content of each part (and about their role not changing from part 2
to part 3) only when part 2 is concluded (see the Instructions in the Appendix
A for details). The two frequent and infrequent feedback treatments were run
in a between-subject design, i.e., each subject participated in only one of two
treatments. We ran twelve sessions per treatment, six entirely composed of fe-
males and six entirely composed of males. Each session involved from 14 to 30
participants, as shown in Table 3. Sessions lasted about 80 minutes.
Average earnings of the experiment were 16 euros including 2.5 euros for
showing up. Table 3 contains summary statistics about the variables elicited in
the postexperimental questionnaire.
6 Results
We present our experimental results in three steps, each corresponding to a
separate section focusing on the behavior of active participants. Section 6.1
reports information about the average investment and the average number of
safe choices made by the active participants depending on social distance. In
Section 6.2, we focus on the individual strategies of investment depending on
the social distance. Finally, in Section 6.3 we focus on the eﬀect of feedback
frequency on the investment decision.
6.1 Investment decisions: the role of Other Regarding Preferences and
Social Distance
In this section we examine the investment decisions of the active participants,
considering both the mean of invested ECUs and the average number of safe
choices depending on whether the investment decision is made on behalf of
another person or not and also depending on the social distance between the
decision maker and the passive participant. We deﬁne the variable safe choice
as a dummy equal to 1 if the active participant does not invest any ECUs in
the lottery-type project and 0 if he invests a positive amount. Our ﬁndings are
summarized in Result 1:
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RESULT 1
Result 1.a Investment decisions made on behalf of a stranger (ST) do not dif-
fer with respect to investment choices with no consequences for others (OT).
Investment decisions made on behalf of a friend (FT) diﬀer with respect to in-
vestment decisions with no consequences on others (OT).
Result 1.b Diﬀerences in investment behavior vary with the level of social dis-
tance dij between the decision maker and the passive participant. When the so-
cial distance is shortened (i.e., investment decisions aﬀect a friend rather than
a stranger), active participants, on average, behave more in line with expected
value maximization, exhibiting less risk seeking.
Support for Result 1 comes from Figure 1 and Table 4. In Figure 1 we plot
the mean of the invested ECUs (panel a) and the average proportion of safe
choices (panel b) depending on the social distance. When active participants
decide only for themselves (OT), they invest, on average, 29.76 ECUs. When
deciding on behalf of a stranger (ST), they slightly decrease the average amount
invested to 28.75 ECUs. Diﬀerently, when deciding on behalf of a friend (FT),
they invest, on average, 24.37 ECUs. According to a set of Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests,8 we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between OT and ST (z=1.276,
p=0.2018) but we do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect between OT and FT
(z=3.702, p=0.0002).
This picture is conﬁrmed when looking at the average proportion of safe choices.
Comparing the mean of the individuals’ proportion of safe choices, we ﬁnd that
in OT the safe choice is made, on average, 26.84% of the time, but in ST and
FT it is made, on average, 28.54% and 40.00% of the time, respectively (see
panel b in Figure 1 and Table 4). According to a set of Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests, statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences are conﬁrmed only when the passive
participant is a friend but not a stranger (OT vs ST: z=1.555, p=0.1200; OT
vs FT: z=4.533, p = 0.0000).
To study the eﬀect of social distance on investment decisions, we compare ST
and FT: we ﬁnd that both the average investment and the average proportion
of safe choices are lower in FT than in ST (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: invested
ECUs ST vs FT, z=3.814, p=0.0001; average number of safe choices: ST vs
FT: z=4.910, p=0.0000). This may be explained with a more important role
played by altruism in the decision process when social distance is reduced. We
investigate this issue further in the next section to better understand the eﬀects
8Unless not diﬀerently speciﬁed, all tests reported are two-sided.
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of altruism in this context.
6.2 The determinants of decisions made on behalf of others
To test for the determinants of altruism in the decision making process when
someone else is aﬀected by the decisions, a closer look at individual behavior
seems warranted. While result 1 is based on average behavior, we explore,
in this section, the relevance of participants’ heterogeneity in choosing q in
OT, ST, and FT. In order to address this issue, we deﬁne three individuals’
investment strategies across the three parts of our experiment by looking at the
average amount of ECUs invested in each possible pairwise comparison of our
OT, ST, and FT. In particular, strategy q¯OT < q¯FT (q¯OT > q¯FT ) indicates
that the active participants’ average investment in OT is lower (higher) than
the average investment in FT, implying that the presence of the friend aﬀects
the investment decision, pushing it in the direction of taking more (less) risk.
Strategy q¯OT = q¯FT reveals no diﬀerences between the average investment made
by the active participants in OT and FT. Similar strategies can be identiﬁed
by comparing the investment decisions in OT to ST and, to study the eﬀect of
social distance, by comparing ST and FT.
RESULT 2
Result 2.a Individuals adopt heterogeneous investment strategies when deciding
on behalf of others.
Result 2.b Individuals exhibit consistency in the choice of strategies across
treatments. Gender diﬀerences and beliefs about the other’s risk attitude explain
the investment decisions across treatments.
Support for this result comes from Tables 5 and 6 which show the percentage
of participants choosing each strategy and the percentage of participants which
is consistent across treatments. Consider Table 5. When comparing OT and
ST, 49% of active participants invest less (q¯OT > q¯ST ), 36% invest more (q¯OT <
q¯ST ), the remaining 15% do not change their investment. When comparing OT
and FT, 59% of active participants invest less (q¯OT > q¯FT ), only 28% invest
more (q¯OT < q¯FT ), while the remaining 13% do not change their investment.
Similar results are obtained comparing ST and FT: 55% of active participants
invest less (q¯ST > q¯FT ), 28% invest more (q¯ST < q¯FT ), while the remaining
17% do not change their investment. Thus Table 5 conﬁrms our hypothesis:
when deciding on behalf of others, individuals adopt diﬀerent strategies and the
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relative majority reduces investment compared to the situation in which the
investment decision has no consequences for others.
Inspection of Table 5 also reveals the existence of gender diﬀerences in the
choice of investment strategies. When deciding on the behalf of others (both an
anonymous stranger or a friend), the proportion of females choosing to reduce
their investment is signiﬁcantly higher than the one of males (two sample test
of proportions: OT vs ST 54% vs 42%, z=1.35, p=.09; OT vs FT 66% vs 49%,
z=1.94, p=.03; ST vs FT 65% vs 44%, z=2.33, p=.01). On the contrary, in
all treatments a signiﬁcantly higher proportion of males do not change their
average investment compared to females: (two sample test of proportions: OT
vs ST 20% vs 10%, z=1.58, p=.06; OT vs FT 22% vs 6%, z=2.67, p=.00; ST vs
FT 29% vs 7%, z=3.19, p=.00). No signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences are observed
when we consider the increase in investments (two sample test of proportions:
OT vs ST m:37% vs f:35%, z=.23, p=.82; OT vs FT m:29% vs f:28%, z=.11,
p=.91; ST vs FT m:27% vs f:28%, z=.10, p=.92).
Having documented the existence of diﬀerences in the investment strategies
within each treatments, it will be informative for us to investigate whether in-
dividuals show consistency in the strategy decisions across treatments and, if
so, which factors account for it. To this end, we look at two diﬀerent levels
of consistency: in panel A of Table 6, we look at the percentage of individuals
who increase (decrease/ do not change) their investment in ST and FT com-
pared to OT (without imposing any relationship between investment choices
in ST and FT). We identify this ﬁrst level as weak consistency. In panel B
of Table 6, we look at the percentage of individuals who progressively increase
(decrease/ do not change) their investment passing from OT to ST and then
to FT as the social distance decreases. We identify this second level as strong
consistency. When considering weak consistency, it can be noted how, overall,
about 77% (N = 98/127) of participants show a consistent investment strat-
egy. In particular, the 57.14% (N = 56/98) of participants who make weakly
consistent decisions reduces their investment both in ST and FT compared to
OT, while 28.57% (N = 28/98) of consistent decisions are made by participants
who increase their investment when deciding on behalf of others rather than
only for themselves. Finally, 14.29% (N = 14/98) of participants do not change
their average investment due to the fact that they are deciding on the behalf
of another person. If we deﬁnes four types of participants, one for each of the
investment strategies indicated in Panel A of Table 6 plus a residual type for
participants who are not weakly consistent, both a Pearson χ2 and a Fisher’s
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exact tests reject the null hypotheses that types are equally distributed across
gender, (p=0.034 and p=0.033, respectively). No other factors seem to explain
the distribution of individual investment strategies.
When considering strong consistency we impose the additional condition that
the average investment should decrease (increase) depending on social distance.
Overall, 50.39% (N = 64/127) of participants can be classiﬁed using this cri-
terion. Panel B of Table 6 gives the same picture of Panel A: the 59.38%
(N = 38/64) of participants classiﬁed as strongly consistent reduce progres-
sively their investment as social distance decreases (i.e., q¯OT > q¯ST > q¯FT ).
The 18.75% (N = 12/64) of participants progressively increase their investment
as social distance decreases (i.e. q¯OT < q¯ST < q¯FT ). If, in addition to the case
of strong consistency, we deﬁne four types of participants, one for each of the
investment strategies indicated in panel B of Table 6 plus a residual type for
participants who are not weakly consistent, both a Pearson χ2 and a Fisher’s
exact test reject the null hypothesis that types are equally distributed across
males and females, (p=0.031 and p=0.030, respectively).
For both classiﬁcations, it can be noted that females are more likely than males
to reduce their investment when deciding on behalf of another person. In the
same situations, males are more likely than females either to increase or not to
change their investment when deciding on behalf of another person.
The analysis at individual level highlights that a certain number of partic-
ipants take more risk in ST or FT than in OT. Altruistic behavior toward a
passive participant may be the result of the willingness to do what the passive
participant would have done. To gain more insight on this, we formally investi-
gate the role of beliefs about the risk attitude of the passive participants. In our
questionnaire we elicit individuals’ beliefs about an anonymous stranger’s SOEP
and friend’s SOEP.9 In Table 7 we present the main results. Estimates are from
Tobit regressions,10 with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
individual level. In all speciﬁcations, the dependent variable is the amount of
ECUs invested by active participants. We control for the feedback frequency
and the blocks of periods. In columns 1 and 2, we pool together observations of
the three parts and add a dummy variable each for part 2 and part 3. We con-
9We use a general risk question of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which
requests that participants give an assessment of their own general willingness to take risks
on a 0-10 scale. Participants were then asked to indicate an anonymous stranger’s and their
friends’ general willingness to take risks.
10We choose a Tobit model since our dependent variable is censored.
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trol for gender (equals 1 if the active participant is a male) and the player’s risk
attitude, as measured with the SOEP. Also, we deﬁne a dummy variable which
equals 1 if a individual adopts a weakly (strongly) consistent strategy and zero
otherwise. The frequency treatment variable is negative and statistically signif-
icant (see next section). Coeﬃcients of the dummy variables identifying part
2 and part 3 are negative but statistically signiﬁcant only when the decision is
made on behalf of a friend, conﬁrming previous results. The strategy variables
are statistically signiﬁcant both when we consider weak consistency (column 1)
and strong consistency (column 2). The signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient of the
SOEP variable indicates that the individual risk attitude has predictive power
for the invested amount. We then study in detail investment decisions in part 2
and 3. In columns 3 and 4, we add as control the beliefs about a passive partic-
ipant’s SOEP (beliefs about an anonymous stranger’s SOEP when the decision
concerns part 2 and beliefs about a friend’s SOEP when the decision concerns
part 3). Given that the decision maker’s SOEP correlates with beliefs about
the anonymous stranger’s and the friend’s SOEP, we control for individual risk
attitude, including the average amount invested in part 1. We are thus able
to obtain clean evidence on the role of beliefs. We run separate regressions by
gender. The results show that both for females and males the investment deci-
sions in part 1 are important to explain those in parts 2 and 3. However, the
importance of beliefs diﬀer across genders: while for female participants beliefs
about a passive participant’s risk attitude do not predict the invested amount,
males seem to rely much more on beliefs in their investment decisions. Impor-
tantly, in both regressions the coeﬃcient of the friend dummy is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant, conﬁrming our conjecture that social distance plays an
important role when decision are made for others.
6.3 The frequency treatment: Other Regarding Preferences, Social Dis-
tance and Myopic Loss Aversion
Our experimental design allows us to investigate whether both the observed
data patterns in section are veriﬁed in diﬀerent contexts and MLA is present
also when investment decisions are made on behalf of others. Our ﬁndings are
summarized in Result 3.
RESULT 3
Result 3.a ORP and SD play a role both in FFT and IFT.
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Result 3.b Amounts invested by active participants on behalf of a stranger
or a friend are lower in the frequent feedback environment rather than in the
infrequent feedback environment. This is veriﬁed, to a lesser extent, when active
participants decide on behalf of a friend.
Support for Result 3 comes from Table 4. First, we separately consider
the frequent and infrequent treatment across the experimental parts. In FFT
active participants invest, on average, 25.31, 23.33, and 21.02 ECUs in part 1,
part 2, and part 3, respectively. A set of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests indicates
that a signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect exists between FFT-O and FFT-F (z=2.328,
p=0.0199) and between FFT-S and FFT-F (z=2.598, p=0.0094).
The average amounts invested in the infrequent treatment are 34.43, 34.40,
and 27.88 ECUs in part 1, part 2, and part 3, respectively. Statistically signif-
icant diﬀerences across treatments are conﬁrmed when comparing IFT-O with
IFT-F (z=2.951, p=0.0032) and IFT-S with IFT-F (z=2.793, p=0.0052). Thus
diﬀerences in the average invested amount are larger across the experimental
parts in the infrequent treatment, and the role of altruism and social distance
is only slightly attenuated in the frequent treatment.11 Data on the mean of
individuals’ proportion of safe choices suggest the same pattern.
Second, in part 1 we conﬁrm a pattern consistent with MLA since the in-
vested amount is lower in the frequent treatment than the invested amount in the
infrequent treatment.12 Similarly, this is veriﬁed when the decision maker makes
a decision on behalf of others. Speciﬁcally, in part 2 the diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant according to a Mann-Whitney test (z=2.763, p=0.0057). Looking at
the average percentage of safe choices, a similar pattern is conﬁrmed (FFT-
S=41%, IFT-S=15%; Mann-Whitney tests, z=3.5527, p=0.0004). Whereas the
diﬀerence regarding safe choices is statistically signiﬁcant (FFT-S=49%, IFT-
S=29%; z=2.1339, p=0.0328 ), the diﬀerence in the average amount invested
is not signiﬁcant (z=1.539, p=0.1238) when decisions are made on behalf of a
friend. One may view the lower eﬀect of the frequency feedback treatment as
evidence of a moderate eﬀect of the MLA when the decision is made on behalf of
a friend. However, this result has to be interpreted with caution. The decision
maker in part 3 reduces the investment in the lottery-type project already in the
11These results are veriﬁed also by separately considering the investment decisions in Lot-
tery A and Lottery B across the experimental parts.
12Interestingly, frequent feedback induces a behavior more closely related to proﬁt maxi-
mization. In contrast, Haisley et al. (2008) document the existence of a reverse myopic eﬀect
for lottery tickets with very small probability of a large gain.
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infrequent treatment. Thus altruism and social distance seem to prevail over
the inﬂuence of MLA on risk taking.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
In everyday life individuals take decision on the behalf of others. This happens in
many diﬀerent contexts which diﬀer in the social distance between the decision
maker and the person aﬀected by the decision: parents take decisions which
aﬀect their children; politicians aﬀects the citizens’ life, physicians decisions are
crucial for their patients, managers’ decisions aﬀect both the workers in the
organizations an the shareholders, etc. Although there is a large literature in
economics that analyzes individual risk taking, there has been less emphasis on
this behavior in the context of social preferences and lottery-type project. In
addition, despite decision making on behalf of others is very common, little is
known about how the presence of others aﬀect the individual behavior.
In this paper, we attempt to bridge this gap by studying in lab risky decisions
when, not only the decision maker, but also other people are involved. Our ﬁrst
key evidence is that people do not behave in the same way when deciding only
for themselves compared to when they decide on behalf of someone else and,
speciﬁcally, they take less risk. This suggests that the decision maker, when
motivated by altruistic reasoning, is concerned about others’ payoﬀs. Yet altru-
ism seems to operate through diﬀerent mechanisms. When deciding for others,
people perceive the responsibility for the outcomes of the lottery, in particular
the negative ones. This eﬀect seems stronger for female individuals, who adopt
a more conservative strategy when investing on behalf of others, independent
of the identity of the passive participant. Instead, male individuals seem to
rely slightly more on beliefs about friends’ risk attitude. Thus, in such circum-
stances both emotional and cognitive aspects seem to enter into the decision
making process (as in Andersson et al., 2013). This evidence is also consistent
with previous works ﬁnding that females are more averse to losses than males
(Schmidt and Traub, 2002). Most importantly, when deciding for others, the
decision maker facing a lottery with negative expected value behaves more like a
rational maximizer agent avoiding non-proﬁtable risk. Similarly to our results,
Sutter (2009) and Chakravarty et al. (2011) ﬁnd that when deciding on behalf
of others, individuals are willing to take more risk in an investment yielding
positive expected value. Thus, it seems that, deciding on the behalf of others
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induces individuals to behave more in line with expected payoﬀ maximization.13
In contrast, Andersson et al. (2013) ﬁnd no diﬀerence in the gain domain; when
losses are possible, they ﬁnd an increase in risk taking when decisions are made
on behalf of others. While Eriksen and Kvaloy (2010) show that a decision
maker facing a lottery with positive expected value does not behave in an opti-
mal way in the sense that he is more risk averse investing others’ money even
though it would pay oﬀ. Thus these studies show mixed ﬁndings; however, they
are not directly comparable since they may be aﬀected by diﬀerences in the
choice domain (see Pahlke et al., 2012a), in the tasks used for the elicitation of
risk preferences, and in the payoﬀ of the decision maker.
Our second key evidence is that the reduction of the amount invested is
larger when a friend, rather than a stranger, is aﬀected by the decision. While
ignored by previous literature, our ﬁnding highlights that social distance is an
important category in the choices aﬀecting others. We acknowledge the fact
that our variation of social distance implements two extreme scenarios; how-
ever, we think this was the best way to reproduce, in a laboratory environment,
extremely diﬀerent situations such as those faced by customers in ﬁnancial mar-
kets. The idea of deciding for a person one has never met and will never meet
is completely diﬀerent from making decisions for a person one had the oppor-
tunity to meet and will surely meet again and repeatedly. The ﬁrst types of
relationships are characterized by high social distance and, in our opinion, are
well captured by decisions made for an anonymous stranger in the lab: the aver-
age characteristics of this person are known, but s/he has no possibility to send
feedback and rediscuss the outcomes of the investment made on his/her behalf.
The second types of relationships are characterized by low social distance where
the investor has the opportunity to meet the ﬁnancial advisor to talk about
her/his risk preferences. Similarly, it is likely that the customer can discuss
the outcome of the investment with the decision maker, and the relationship
between them will become personal. We think that this second situation is ap-
proximated reasonably well in FT: the decision maker knows the friend’s risk
attitude and, similarly, he will discuss with her/him his investment choices once
the experimental session is concluded. Our aim has been to capture more than
the mere eﬀect of feedback by the passive participant as implemented in Pahlke
et al. (2012b). Rather, we tried to implement two diﬀerent decision situations
13Similarly, in Albrecht et al. (2011) individuals are more patient when making intertem-
poral decisions for another person.
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as we think that the two situations we want to capture do not simply diﬀer
in the possibility of receiving feedback or not but rather in a diﬀerent level of
emotional proximity, that is, a diﬀerent level of social distance, as deﬁned by
Charness and Gneezy (2008).
In light of the emergence of a high level of anonymity in many real world
situations, our framework calls for a reconsideration of non monetary motives
also in those contexts. Our ﬁndings are relevant for contract design when tasks
concern risk choices on behalf of others. Another implication of this work is
that the proximity of the relationship is a factor which deserves to be taken into
account since it may induce a diﬀerence in the level of risk seeking behavior.
Overall, this paper provides a novel framework regarding the decision making
process under risk when others are involved. Further studies are required to
generalize our ﬁndings about other regarding concerns and social distance to
other contexts (i.e., lottery with positive expected value). Important avenues
for future research are to explore systematically whether behavioral biases are
attenuated or exacerbated in those circumstances.
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Figure 1: Top panels display the mean of invested ECUs; bottom panels display
the proportion of times a safe choice is made.
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Table 1: Lotteries
Success Failure Expected Value
Earnings Probability Earnings Probability for full investment
Lottery A 2.5q .33 -1q .67 82.5
Lottery B 1.8q .25 0.5q .75 82.5
Table 2: Treatments: Social Distance and Frequency Feedback
Social Distance Frequent Feedback Infrequent Feedback
Part 1: Own (OT) No social distance FFT-O IFT-O
Part 2: Stranger(ST) High social distance FFT-S IFT-S
Part 3: Friend (FT) Low social distance FFT-F IFT-F
Table 3: Participants and Treatments
Frequent Feedback Infrequent Feedback Total
Session 6 6 12
Participants 130 124 254
Active Participants 65 62 127
% of Male 47.69 45.16 46.46
Active Participants’ SOEP 4.88 4.68 4.78
Active Participants’ beliefs
about the stranger’s SOEP 4.52 4.58 4.55
Active Participants’ beliefs
about the friend’s SOEP 4.80 4.84 4.82
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Table 4: Average amount of ECUs invested and percentage of safe choices in
each treatment (St. Dev. in parenthesis)
Panel A: Average amount of ECUs invested
Own Stranger Friend
Overall 25.31 23.33 21.02
Frequent Feedback (19.85) (20.29) (19.84)
Lottery A 26.82 24.05 24.87
(22.16) (20.05) (22.85)
Lottery B 23.80 23.03 17.68
(23.08) (25.69) ( 22.34)
Overall 34.43 34.40 27.88
Infrequent Feedback (21.44) (22.30) (22.97)
Lottery A 35.56 37.62 30.94
(22.75) (22.98) (26.36)
Lottery B 33.29 31.18 24.72
(24.93) (24.94) (25.71)
Total 29.76 28.84 24.48
(21.06) (21.92) (21.63)
Panel B: Average Percentage of Safe Choices
Own Stranger Friend
Overall 0.35 0.41 0.49
Frequent Feedback (0.36) (0.38) (0.37)
Lottery A 0.28 0.39 0.42
(0.38) (0.38) (0.42)
Lottery B 0.42 0.44 0.56
(0.40) (0.43) ( 0.41)
Overall 0.18 0.15 0.29
Infrequent Feedback (0.34) (0.30) (0.40)
Lottery A 0.16 0.11 0.24
(0.36) (0.29) (0.41)
Lottery B 0.20 0.19 0.34
(0.37) (0.34 ) (0.44)
Total (Frequent and 0.27 0.28 0.40
Infrequent Feedback (0.36) (0.37) (0.40)
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Table 5: Individual Investment Strategies and Social Distance
Panel A: Own vs Stranger
(OT vs ST)
% q¯OT > q¯ST % q¯OT < q¯ST % q¯OT = q¯ST
Male 42.37 37.29 20.34
N=25 N=22 N=12
Female 54.41 35.29 10.29
N=37 N=24 N=7
Total 48.82 36.22 14.96
N=62 N=46 N=19
Panel B: Own vs Friend
(OT vs FT)
% q¯OT > q¯FT % q¯OT < q¯FT % q¯OT = q¯FT
Male 49.15 28.81 22.03
N=29 N=17 N=13
Female 66.17 27.94 5.88
N=46 N=18 N=4
Total 58.27 28.35 13.39
N=74 N=36 N=17
Panel C: Stranger vs Friend
(ST vs FT)
% q¯ST > q¯FT % q¯ST < q¯FT % q¯ST = q¯FT
Male 44.07 27.12 28.81
N=26 N=16 N=17
Female 64.71 27.94 7.35
N=45 N=18 N=5
Total 55.12 27.56 17.32
N=70 N=35 N=22
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Table 6: Individual Consistency and Investment Strategies
Panel A: weak consistency
% (q¯OT > q¯ST % (q¯OT < q¯ST % (q¯OT = q¯ST Overall
and q¯OT > q¯FT ) and q¯OT < q¯FT ) and q¯OT = q¯FT ) Consistent
Male 38.98 25.42 18.64 83.05
N=23 N=15 N=11 N=49/59
Female 48.53 19.12 4.41 72.06
N=33 N=13 N=3 N=49/68
Total 44.09 22.05 11.02 77.16
N=56 N=28 N=14 N=98/127
Panel B: strong consistency
% (q¯OT > q¯ST > q¯FT ) % (q¯OT < q¯ST < q¯FT ) % (q¯OT = q¯ST = q¯FT ) Overall
Consistent
Male 22.03 11.86 18.64 52.54
N=13 N=7 N=11 N=31/59
Female 36.76 7.35 4.41 48.53
N=25 N=5 N=3 N=33/68
Total 29.92 9.45 11.02 50.39
N=38 N=12 N=14 N=64/127
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Table 7: Invested ECUs in the Lottery-Type Project Active Participants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method: Tobit model
Frequent feedbacks -14.86∗∗ -14.46∗∗ -5.581 -9.198
(-2.98) (-2.82) (-1.24) (-0.97)
Block 2 2.747 2.776 -0.463 4.936
(1.57) (1.58) (-0.17) (1.22)
Block 3 -6.035∗∗ -6.028∗∗ -10.99∗∗ -2.416
(-2.56) (-2.55) (-3.27) (-0.54)
Block 4 -6.333∗∗ -6.293∗∗ -12.28∗∗∗ -3.136
(-2.54) (-2.52) (-3.50) (-0.64)
Stranger (part 2) -1.526 -1.512
(-0.78) (-0.77)
Friend (part 3) -9.401∗∗∗ -9.485∗∗∗ -9.028∗∗∗ -8.519∗∗
(-3.41) (-3.40) (-3.63) (-2.27)
Gender -3.753 -4.700
(-0.72) (-0.92)
SOEP 2.951∗∗ 2.849∗∗
(2.54) (2.43)
Weak consistent type -11.34∗
(-1.85)
Strong consistent type -9.488∗
(-1.82)
qOT 1.054
∗∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗
(8.14) (5.93)
Beliefs SOEP 0.338 4.235∗∗
(0.37) (2.08)
Constant 29.82∗∗∗ 26.51∗∗∗ -1.896 -28.72∗∗
(3.78) (3.66) (-0.29) (-2.08)
N 4571 4571 1632 1416
Log likelihood -16347.0 -16347.5 -5785.7 -4369.6
Part 1,2 and 3 1,2 and 3 2 and 3 2 and 3
Gender F and M F and M F M
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix A 
In this section, we report the instructions for our two treatments. We report, in parentheses, the text which is 
specific for the Frequent Feedback treatment (FFT) and Infrequent Feedback treatment (FFT) respectively. 
The post-experimental questionnaire is available upon request. 
Instructions
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment funded by the Max Planck Institute of Economics. 
Please switch off your mobile and remain quiet. It is strictly forbidden to talk to the other participants. 
Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to your aid. 
You will receive 2.50 Euros for showing up on time. Besides this, you can earn more. The show-up fee and 
any additional amounts of money you may earn will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
Payments are carried out privately, i.e., the others will not see your earnings. During the experiment we shall 
speak of ECUs (Experimental Currency Unit) rather than Euros. The conversion rate between them is 1 
ECUs = 1 euro cent. The experiment consists of three parts. The instructions for the first part follow on the 
next page. The instructions for the second part will be distributed after all participants have completed the 
first part. The instructions for the third part will be distributed after all participants have completed the 
second part. All instructions are identical for all participants and we read them aloud such that you can verify 
this.
Detailed Instruction for Part 1 
The experiment consists of 12 successive periods. The decisions will be organized in 4 blocks, and within 
each block, you will face the same identical decision 3 times. In each period you will receive 100 ECUs. You 
are asked to choose the portion of this amount (between 0 and 100 ECUs, inclusive) that you wish to invest 
in a risky project. The rest of the ECUs (those you don’t invest) will be accumulated in your total balance. 
The Risky Project.
In any particular period, there is a certain probability that the project will fail and a complementary chance 
that it will succeed. In each period you will be informed about: 
1) of the probability of success and failure of the project,  
2) the amount that you obtain in case of failure and in case of success.  
In the box below you see two examples of risky project. 
Example 1. 
With a 40% chance the investment in the risky project will be successful, while with a 60% chance it will 
fail.  If it is successful, you receive 2.5 times the amount invested. If the investment is unsuccessful, you lose 
the amount invested. 
 If you invest 100 ECUs in the risky project,   
o if the investment is successful you will earn 250 ECUs,  
o if the investment fails, you will earn 0 ECU. 
 If you invest 50 ECUs in the risky project,  
o if  the investment is successful, you will earn 125 ECUs from the project + the 50 ECUs that you did 
not invest, for a total of 175 ECUs;  
o if the investment fails, you will earn 0 from the project + the 50 ECUs that you did not invest, for a 
total of 50 ECUs. 
Example 2.  
With a 50% chance the investment in the risky project will be successful, while with a 50% chance it will 
fail. If it is successful, you receive 1.5 times the amount invested. If the investment is unsuccessful, you will 
only earn 0.5 (i.e. half) of the amount invested. 
 If you invest 100 ECUs in the risky project,   
o if the investment is successful you will earn 150 ECUs,  
o if the investment fails, you will earn  half of what you invested, i.e 50 ECUs. 
 If you invest 5 ECUs in the risky project,  
o if  the investment is successful, you will earn 750 ECUs from the project + the 50 ECUs that you did 
not invest, for a total of 125 ECUs;  
o if the investment fails, you will earn 25 ECUs from the project + the 50 ECUs that you did not 
invest, for a total of 75 ECUs. 
How Do We Determine if the Risky Project Succeeds?  
The success of the project depends on a random drawing made by the computer. In each consecutive period 
the computer will make a random and independent throw, and the outcome in a given period is the same for 
all participants. 
Feedback about the investment in the Risky Project. 
[FFT:  At the beginning of every period, after the project is presented, you choose the amount you wish to 
allocate to the risky project in that period. You then learn the outcome for that period (recall that you start 
with 100ECUs in each period). Next, you would make an investment decision for the next period]. 
[IFT: At the beginning of period 1, after the projects are presented, you choose the amount you wish to 
allocate to the risky project for each block, i.e. for the next 3 periods (periods 1, 2, and 3).  So, it means that 
you have to decide on your investment 4 in blocks of 3 periods each. Within each block the projects are 
identical, i.e. they have the same probabilities to be successful or not and the same amounts associated to 
success/failure. So, you choose to invest X ECUS in the project in period 1, X ECUS will also be invested in 
the project in periods 2 and 3. When period 3 is over you will get to see the outcome of the first three 
periods. Then period 4 starts and again you have to decide on how much to invest in the project for the next 
block of three periods (periods 4, 5 and 6). You will then see the outcome for the preceding periods (periods 
4, 5 and 6). The same procedure applies for periods 7, 8 and 9 and for the last block of periods 10, 11 and 12. 
Note that the computer implements the random draw in each period, but that you decide on X ECUS for 
three consecutive periods.]
Final Payments 
At the end of the entire experiment, one of the three parts of the experiment will be selected to be relevant 
for your final earnings. If this part, which is part 1, is selected, then your total earnings for the experiment are 
the sum of the earnings in each of the 12 periods. The amount of ECUs you accumulated will be converted in 
Euros, summed to the show up fee and paid in cash.   
Detailed Instruction for Part 2
In part 2, only half of the participants have to take a decision, we will identify these participant as active 
participants.
You will learn on your screen whether you will be randomly assigned to be an active or passive participant. 
All participants have the same probability of being assigned to be active or passive. 
If you are an ACTIVE participant 
You will face the same task as in Part 1 of the experiment. 
The only difference in part 2 is that your decision will affect the earnings of another anonymous participant 
in this room (one of the passive participant). For all the 12 periods you will be paired to the same passive 
participant.
However, it will be not possible for you to know the identity of the passive participant for whom you have 
been deciding. Similarly, it will not be possible for him to know the identity of who took the decision which 
affects him. Note that, this participant is NOT the friend who came with you today.  
Final Payments 
At the end of the entire experiment, one of the three parts of the experiment will be selected to be relevant 
for your final earnings. If this part, i.e. part 2, is selected, then: 
1) the passive participants matched with you will earn the sum of the earnings obtained as a 
consequence of you investment choices in each of the 12 periods of part 2.  
2) you will earn the same amount of ECUs he earns. 
The amount of ECUs accumulated will be converted in Euros, summed to the show up fee and paid in cash. 
If you are a PASSIVE participant 
While we are waiting the other participant to take his decision, we will ask you to answer some questions.  
Final Payments 
At the end of the entire experiment, one of the three parts of the experiment will be selected to be relevant 
for your final earnings. If this part, i.e. part 2, is selected, then: 
1) you will earn the sum of the earnings obtained as a consequence of the investment choices made by 
the active participant in each of the 12 periods of part 2.  
2) The active participant will earn the same amount of ECUs you earn. 
The amount of ECUs accumulated will be converted in Euros, summed to the show up fee and paid in cash. 
Detailed Instruction for Part 3 
In part 3, as in part 2, only half of the participants have to take a decision. In particular, if you were assigned 
to be an active participant in part 2, then, you will be active also in part 3. Similarly, if you were selected to 
be a passive participant in part 2, then you have to wait until all the active participants have made their 
choices. 
If you are an ACTIVE participant 
You will face the same task as in Part 1 of the experiment. 
The only difference in part 2 is that your decision will affect the earnings of the friend who came with you at 
the lab today. For all the 15 periods you will be paired to the same participant, your friend.  
Final Payments 
At the end of the entire experiment, one of the three parts of the experiment will be selected to be relevant 
for your final earnings. If this part, i.e. part 3, is selected, then: 
1) your friend will earn the sum of the earnings obtained as a consequence of you investment choices in 
each of the 12 periods of part 2.  
2) you will earn the same amount of ECUs he earns. 
The amount of ECUs accumulated will be converted in Euros, summed to the show up fee and paid in cash. 
If you are a PASSIVE participant 
While we are waiting the other participant to take his decision, we will ask you to answer some questions.  
Final Payments 
At the end of the entire experiment, one of the three parts of the experiment will be selected to be relevant 
for your final earnings. If this part, i.e. part 3, is selected, then: 
1) you will earn the sum of the earnings obtained as a consequence of the investment choices made by 
your friend in each of the 12 periods of part 2.  
2) Your friend will earn the same amount of ECUs you earn. 
The amount of ECUs accumulated will be converted in Euros, summed to the show up fee and paid in cash. 
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